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ABSTRACT: 
 In an effort to revitalize urban cores, and to maintain  
competition with rapidly rising suburbs, the federal government equipped 
cities with new tools in the mid-20th century.  But the federal government’s 
redevelopment plans focused primarily on highway development and land 
clearance and this focus has led to a breakdown of urban districts with 
vibrant, active neighborhoods and gave rise to concentrated and cyclical 
poverty, and a concomitant rise in business flight from urban centers.  This 
paper focuses on the outcome of urban renewal projects in Kansas City’s 
census tracts 24 and 33.
 Slowed growth in urban cores, clamoring property owners,  
downtown business elites, urban blight and booming suburbs all convinced 
the federal government that large scale urban renewal was necessary to 
save the city from obsolescence. The result from urban renewal projects on 
Kansas City’s east side has concentrated poverty, destroyed the urban fabric, 
reduced density and left a community with less agency than compared to 
pre-urban renewal.
  Communities anchor us to resources and social networks. They 
provide us the social organization needed to boost individual agency and 
improve our neighborhoods, lobby for scarce resources, and also empower 
us to ward off undesirable developments or troublesome vagrants. The  
residential neighborhoods are where stability, diversity, interaction and 
healthy living must take place. The city builds a sturdy tax base and houses 
its educated, marketable workforce in residential neighborhoods. It is 
because nearly everyone can understand the deep bond we all share with 
place that makes the local and federal government’s urban renewal  
policies so pernicious.  The federal urban renewal policies displaced many, 
destroyed much and helped few. The government has encouraged  
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development that is counter beneficial to our urban centers. The federal 
government’s answer to fixing the urban decline, such as dilapidated  
housing, blight and neglect, was highway development and land clearance, 
which did little to create a better urban environment and disproportionately 
affected those who were of a lower socioeconomic class. Furthermore, the 
government, through its actions, has weakened the resource structure of 
those in areas affected by urban renewal, thus crippling their social agency 
to combat damaging urban policy. The end result of urban renewal was the 
creation of concentrated and perpetual poverty and neighborhoods with 
little social agency. 
 This case study will examine census tracts 24 and 33 abutting  
Kansas City’s central business district (CBD), home of several urban 
renewal projects, to understand how urban renewal policy affected these 
neighborhoods and residents. Census Tracts 24 and 33 are bound by 9th 
Street on the north, Prospect Avenue on the west, 23rd Street on the south 
and Cleveland Avenue on the east. These census tracts have experienced 
both large and small scale projects that were meant to reverse urban decay 
and spur reinvestment. The two largest undertakings were the interstate 
highway (I-70) and the nearby Wayne Minor Court public housing projects. 
I will provide an overview of federal urban renewal policy and examine the 
census tracts before, during and after urban renewal programs to  
understand the influence of federal policies on residents and  
neighborhoods in census tracts 24 and 33.  
EFFECTS OF FEDERAL uRBAN RENEwAL POLICy
 In response to suburbanization and urban decay, the federal 
government empowered cities with new tools to combat the dilapidation of 
housing, spur new development, and appease downtown stakeholders by 
giving eminent domain powers to municipalities in order to facilitate land 
clearance and highway building.1 This was an attempt to level the playing 
field with suburbia where land clearance and blight were not barriers to 
development. 
  The Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA),  
empowered by the American Housing Act of 1949, was created in 1953 and 
spearheaded the Kansas City effort to remove blighted properties.2 Several 
urban renewal districts around downtown were created and eventually the 
entire CBD was slated for redevelopment. The city manager advocated  
using the LCRA in order to speed the construction of highways into  
downtown and use the urban renewal funds to construct segregated public 
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housing for the displaced residents.112 This process would clear large tracts 
of land and transfer property to new owners for redevelopment. In 1952 
Mayor William Kemp proclaimed that the LCRA would create space for 
parking and city planners saw redevelopment as a way to retrofit the urban 
core to suburban standards in order to stay competitive.3 All this was done 
in the name of financial stabilization with emphasis on the privatization of 
the urban core.
 During the 1940s middle class consumption and social mobility 
were very high. Growing mobility would continue into the 1950s and 1960s 
with the government subsidizing sprawl development with FHA loans and 
municipality-bonded infrastructure on the fringe.4 As the socially and  
spatially mobile left the city for suburban living, a cycle was created in 
which the city and the people who remained in the newly economically 
drained neighborhoods would be victim. As new roads and highways were 
created to accommodate the wealthy commuters, even more development 
would appear on the edge. Soon businesses would follow and previously 
healthy urban neighborhoods would be in decline without economic  
capacity to support retail markets or other commercial services. Kansas 
City, needing to reverse this decline, cleared land for highway construction 
and built housing projects to relocate the displaced in segregated  
neighborhoods. This was the fix and it culminated in the development of 
Wayne Minor Court public housing, Interstate 70 and the South Midtown 
Expressway (US 71). 
mAkINg OF AN uNDERCLASS: CENSuS TRACTS 24/33
 I start with the 1950 census and gather key economic statistics on 
residents and the neighborhood. Comparing this data with the 1970 and 
2000 census it is obvious that tracts 24 and 33 were not stabilized in the 
1950s during urban renewal.  In fact the opposite can be said of this area 
as population, home value, vacancy, unemployment, and income have all 
fallen in the area when adjusted for inflation to 2011 dollars. 
 First we examine the loss of population and housing units. This is 
important for a community, as William Julius Wilson writes, “Lower density 
makes it harder for a sense of community to develop or for people to feel 
that they can find safety in numbers.”5 The area’s increasing joblessness 
and vacancy have an effect on those residents who remain. Wilson also 
studied the decline of urban neighborhoods such as tracts 24/33 and found 
that 71% of residents felt their neighborhood had deteriorated and gotten 
worse.6 Wilson also notes the psychological effect joblessness has on a 
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community and the worry residents have for personal belongings.7  
Joblessness and poverty lead to low levels of social organization. High  
rates of unemployment lead to community problems that cripple social  
organization such as crime, gangs, drug trafficking, and broken families.8 
These elements link poverty, the underclass and the culmination of divisive 
housing policy during urban renewal. 
By ThE NumBERS:
 Only 31% of 1950 housing units exist today. Since 1950 there has 
been a 465% decrease in population. Even with fewer housing units,  
vacancy has soared from 1950 levels to well over the state average of 12%. 
By comparing the numbers it seems that in 1950, census tracts 24/33 were 
far more prosperous and stable than in 1970 thru 2000. 
 The housing vacancy rate of the tracts was very healthy, under one 
percent, in spite of the fact that the area’s average household income was 
66% of the national average. So as time and investment went on, the housing 
units in the tracts decreased in number and value. This is counter to the 
belief that the massive slum clearing of the 1960s would elevate the area 
economically and socially.
        *All figures adjusted for inflation to year 2000 dollars. (US Census)
As those with money left the city, it was only a matter of time before the  
jobs and other resources would follow.  When the income levels of  
neighborhoods plummet it generally starts a downward spiral that is  
difficult to reverse. First, the commercial services that made central city 
neighborhoods so convenient left to be in a more desirable demographic. 
The mean household income of census tracts 24 and 33 is 43% of the  
average American household income. As the wealthy corporate decision 
makers invested in suburban edge nodes it became desirable to relocate 
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larger commercial offices around their homes and increasingly their  
suburban workforce. This decentralizes the city, making its core less  
relevant.  The heterodox approach to economics suggests that if one’s social 
structure is weakened then it also adversely affects one’s power and the 
distribution of resources. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton wrote “in a 
market such as the United States opportunities, resources, and benefits are 
not distributed evenly across the urban landscape, certain residential areas 
have more prestige, greater affluence, higher home values, better services, 
and safer streets than others.”9 It was, in part, government action that was 
crippling urban neighborhoods and facilitating the spread of wealth to the 
fringe, which led to segregating the less socially and spatially mobile class 
of people in urban cores. The segregation that the Housing Authority of 
Kansas City used to locate and house residents along with their poverty 
status created an underclass in census tracts 24 and 33.10
 As wealth and employment opportunities left the city, neighbor-
hoods were left with less powerful representation and influence to obtain 
much needed assets. Cities need the middle class tax base to be viable. It is 
the middle class who have the means to purchase homes, support commercial 
services and sustain large businesses as well as provide the city with a well 
educated, able-bodied work force in order to be competitive with 
competing centers.
 By the 1940s the federal government was finally involved in  
developing public, low-income housing. The government’s intentions  
were to stabilize cities and reverse blight and population loss. However, 
with the passage of the 1949 Federal Housing Act, the government set new  
requirements and standards for building.11 The new housing act  
mandated that towers be uniform in stories and set generic plans with  
cost-cutting initiatives. Moreover, the financial management rules imposed 
by the government stated that rents must cover maintenance and staked the 
success of these projects on the shoulders of the low-income tenants and 
their ability to generate income.12 The government did little to increase the 
resources available to the lower-class residents and for residents of these 
large superblock complexes life became challenging. In Kansas City the 
only high rise development under urban renewal was the Wayne Minor 
Court housing projects. It was made up of five 10-story towers located 
between 9th and 11th Streets and Woodland and Brooklyn Avenues. Wayne 
Minor was built to house the displaced black residents affected by land 
clearance and highway building. The projects developed a poor reputation 
of inadequate maintenance, mismanagement, financial difficulties and  
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neglect.13 Wayne Minor’s reputation was not helped when two buildings 
were condemned and the other three buildings’ top floors were shuttered 
due to low occupancy.14 Vandalism and security in the area became a  
concern and eventually the poor refused to live in them. Occupancy rates 
in the projects never surpassed 60% and the housing development was de-
stroyed less than 30 years after it was built.15 The development was created 
to rid the area of blight but ended up creating new problems. The demoli-
tion erased 650 residential units that were never replaced. Instead, the 
former residents were forced to utilize the Section 8 housing program or 
fend for themselves in the open market. Today Wayne Minor public hous-
ing is a series of townhomes along 11th Street. After the demolition, the 
Housing Authority of Kansas City conceded that high-rise residential units 
cannot work for low-income, Kansas City families. Even when faced with 
the evidence of poor management and inadequate maintenance, the  
housing agency could not admit to doing the community an injustice by 
allowing and concentrating substandard housing in the community. Today 
the Kansas City Housing Authority is in receivership after a federal judge 
noted that the agency was the worst run in the nation.16 
 Today tract 33 is 92% black and tract 24 is 50% black and the mean 
income of both tracts is 34% below the national average. The concrete  
and steel erected through the urban renewal process did little to address 
the social and economic complexities that hinder the success of black  
and mixed-race urban communities. Instead of equity and advocacy  
planning, the government pursued the interests of property owners over 
those of everyday residents, both black and white. The result is a  
homogenous concentration of the underclass with little agency for change 
and without true advocacy. Without investing in social causes and human 
capital the redevelopment of buildings will never address the root of  
inequity and basic human civil rights. 
hIghwAy POLICy
 When it comes to the government attempting to fix urban issues, 
one Band-Aid commonly applied was the highway. The highway became a 
two-pronged answer for urban issues; it permitted the further consumption 
of houses and land by the middle class as well as a way to destroy perceived 
blight in cities. Today, one can go to any major American city and see the 
result of our Interstate system on our cities. Most downtowns are choked off 
or disconnected by the presence of highways. Neighborhoods have become 
less pedestrian friendly, marked with dead ends or polluted by their noise 
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or unsightliness; this is especially true in census tracts 24 and 33. Highways 
divide communities; they also have become political dividers in that they 
allow residents to quickly pass through urban communities without any 
engagement. High priority was given to highway construction in the past to 
create middle-class jobs and to facilitate the middle-class lifestyle.17 
 The resulting new interstate system, funded 90 percent by  
federal money, had devastating effects on American cities. The new  
highways enabled industry and commercial activities to leave the city and 
build in the suburbs following people and further deepening the problems 
of the city with abandonment and a declining tax base.18 The new highway 
system was developed by supporters of the decentralization of people and 
jobs. They wanted a way to bypass the urban areas and to create a  
car-dependent culture. Urban planners of the day such as Robert Moses 
and others advocated that highways should penetrate the heart of the city 
and remove blight and improve accessibility to and from the suburbs.19 The 
same attitude was present in Kansas City. A large portion of the 1947 Kansas 
City Master Plan is devoted to highway and arterial street building with 
seemingly little concern for the area but with great concern for those who 
needed to bypass it.20  A 1946 traffic study showed planners that 40% of the 
traffic in the central business district was passing through the district with 
a destination beyond downtown. Combined with increasing investment in 
suburban areas and increasing auto ownership, Kansas City was hedging its 
bets and positioning itself for federal highway funds.121 Planners and  
governments seemed to be disinterested in the effects of the highway  
system on those remaining in the city.22
  Suburbanization aided by urban renewal has economically and 
racially segregated us. Today 86 percent of whites live in a neighborhood 
where minorities make up less than 1 percent of the population.23 The 
federal policies have led to a decline in our cities and less options for 
those of a lesser economic class. 
 It is not solely the presence of highways and suburbs that have 
further disadvantaged urban residents; wealth was been pulled out of urban 
neighborhoods. Those with strong resource and cultural structures have 
powerful agency to cause change and influence. And those with weaker  
resource and cultural structures have little agency to improve things. So 
it is reasonable to acknowledge that the actions that have weakened the 
central city have also weakened the agency of those living there.  Those of 
lesser economic status were not aided by the policies or subsidies of the 
federal government’s urban renewal. The government catered to those with 
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the power of consumption and was not concerned with the effects on the 
lower class and what future was developing for them or our major cities. 
The federal government’s policies tried to fix major urban issues with  
massive demolition and highway construction during urban renewal, which 
has led to creating new and complex problems in the city. These policies 
contributed to the development of sprawling suburbs and concentrated 
poverty. It is important that the government strengthen its focus and  
position on reversing decline in the urban core while moving to strengthen 
our cities with not just investment in infrastructure but in people as well.  
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